I am a fourth year Economics PhD Student at Boston University. My research is in microeconomic theory.

I received a BSc in Mathematics and Economics in 2021, and an MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics in 2022, both from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Here is my CV. 

Abstract: A principal chooses a policy at a future date, and wishes to match the policy to an uncertain state. An agent chooses when to make an irreversible investment, and wishes to invest only if he expects the policy will be favorable. Information about the state is publicly and gradually revealed over time. Moral hazard arises because the agent wishes to wait for more information. To incentivize the agent to invest early, it is optimal for the principal to provide certainty about her future policy. This is inefficient -- the agent's benefit from certainty is always outweighed by the principal's cost from reduced policy flexibility. The agent receives rent only if policy and early investment are complements. We provide conditions for moral hazard to delay investment. Our results apply to environmental subsidies and procurement of vaccines.

Abstract: Motivated by the prevalence of prediction problems in the economy, we study markets in which firms sell models to a consumer to help improve their prediction. Firms decide whether to enter, choose models to train on their data, and set prices. The consumer can purchase multiple models and use a weighted average of the models bought. Market outcomes can be expressed in terms of the bias-variance decompositions of the models that firms sell. We give conditions when symmetric firms will choose different modeling techniques, e.g., each using only a subset of available covariates. We also show firms can choose inefficiently biased models or inefficiently costly models to deter entry by competitors.
(Presented at EC'25)